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Abstract
This paper explores the demand for soft, self-imposed commitment, and subsequent com-
pliance behaviour, using a framed field study in a higher education setting. We find a
substantial soft commitment demand and a remarkably high failure to comply with the cho-
sen commitment. Students are more likely to demand soft commitment if they expect the
task to be more time-consuming and their relative performance to be lower. Failure to com-
ply is associated with previous grade and personality traits. We find no evidence that soft
commitment affects grades.
JEL classification: C93; D03; I23.
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1 Introduction
Procrastination is a pervasive phenomenon in the workplace, in the household, in health care
and in the classroom. In higher education, procrastinating study effort may lead students to fall
behind, submit assignments past their deadlines, and ultimately graduate later and with lower
grades and have worse career prospects.
Students who are aware of their tendency to procrastinate may decide to demand commit-
ment to restrict their future choices and thus mitigate future procrastination. Commitment
is defined “hard” when it cannot be broken or leads to real economic penalties if broken, and
“soft” when it leads to primarily psychological consequences, i.e. either purely psychological
costs or minor material costs (Bryan and Nelson, 2010). The key and interesting feature of soft
commitment is that it allows for both commitment and flexibility. Thus, if effective, it may be
a more appropriate device for individuals who want to restrict their future choices due to self-
control problems, but value flexibility due to uncertainty about the future (e.g. costs shocks).1
While, as further discussed below, there is substantial evidence of students’ demand for hard
commitment, research on soft commitment is still very limited.
∗We are truly grateful to Derrick Chong. Financial support from the Nuffield Foundation (grant EDU/41689)
is gratefully acknowledged.
†Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX. E-mail:
dan.anderberg@rhul.ac.uk
‡Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113, Bonn, Germany.
E-mail: cerrone@coll.mpg.de
§Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX. E-mail: ar-
naud.chevalier@rhul.ac.uk
1Amador et al. (2006) and Galperti (2015) study the optimal provision of commitment to individuals who
value both commitment and flexibility.
1
In this paper, we explore the demand for soft, self-imposed commitment – in the form of
early deadlines, and subsequent compliance behaviour, using a framed field study in a higher
education setting. In particular, we measure soft commitment demand and compliance, study
the characteristics of the students who demand commitment and those who break the chosen
commitment, and explore whether soft commitment improves grades.
Our sample consists of first year university students enrolled in a course which involves an
assessed take-home essay to be submitted by a deadline. As part of our study, the students were
asked to complete a brief survey, which automatically entitled them to a lottery ticket with a
negligible expected value. The survey asked the students to choose an individual deadline for
the submission of the essay, which could be either the official deadline or an earlier date. If
students subsequently failed to comply with the self-chosen early deadline, their lottery ticket
would become invalid. Hence, commitment was soft: it could be broken, and breaking it involved
primarily psychological costs, and a negligible material cost. As early submission did not give
the students any material benefit, they had no reason to commit to an early deadline other than
the willingness to avoid procrastination.
More than 43% of the students self-chosen an early soft deadline, but the deadline chosen
was on average only on 1.90 days earlier than the official one. Thus, the commitment demand
was substantial, but the commitment chosen was not strong. Almost 74% of the students who
demanded commitment subsequently failed to comply with it.
Students are more likely to demand commitment if they expect the task to be more time-
consuming and their relative performance to be lower. They are more likely to break the
chosen commitment it if they got a lower grade in the previous assignment, and if they are
more extravert and less emotionally stable. The comparison of our treated cohorts with two
subsequent untreated cohorts provides no evidence that soft commitment affects grades.
Our study relates to the literature on voluntary commitment in the form of self-chosen
deadlines. Using a sample of 99 professionals enrolled in an executive-education course at MIT,
Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) (henceforth AW) find that individuals self-impose intermediate
deadlines even if breaking such deadlines leads to a grade penalty.2 The key difference between
our study and AW’s study is that, due to the grade penalty, the commitment they offer is hard.
Moreover, their grade penalty crucially depends on students’ ability and personality, which raises
the concern that each individual’s cost from breaking the deadline is unknown and variable. Bisin
and Hyndman (2014) find a strong demand for self-imposed deadlines – although that does not
increase task completion rates. Their study differs from ours because their deadlines are hard,
the task is artificial (alphabetising lists of words) and the rewards are guaranteed.
Our work also contributes to the emerging literature on soft commitment. In a recent paper
Himmler et al. (2017) offer university students the possibility to sign a non-binding agreement
where they declare that they will adhere to the exam schedule recommended by the university.
They find that this soft commitment device leads students to take and pass more exams, but
does not affect their grade point average. Our study differs from theirs as our soft commitment
device is deadline-based.
Finally, by relating personality traits to soft commitment demand and compliance, our work
2Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) also find that students’ performance is better under externally imposed, evenly
spaced deadlines than self-imposed ones, whereas Burger et al. (2011) find that externally imposed, intermediate
deadlines lead to lower task completion rates.
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contributes to the literature linking personality traits to economic decisions, particularly self-
control behaviour (Hurd et al., 2012).
2 Design
Our sample consists of first year university students in the School of Management at Royal
Holloway University of London, enrolled in a marketing course that involves an assessed take-
home essay to be submitted by a deadline. The essay counts 60% towards the final grade in
the course. As part of our in-class study, all the students were asked by their “seminar leaders”
(i.e. the teaching assistants in charge of teaching the tutorials) to complete a brief survey at
the beginning of the class. Before completing the survey, the students were asked to sign a
consent form, as required by Royal Holloway University’s ethical guidelines.3 The completion
of the survey automatically entitled the students to a lottery ticket. The lottery’s prizes were
Amazon vouchers and the expected value of a ticket was £5. The survey asked each student to
nominate an individual deadline for submission of the essay, which could be either the official
deadline (which was about 6 weeks after the date of the survey) or an earlier date. If students
subsequently failed to comply with the self-chosen early deadline, their lottery ticket would
become invalid. Thus, by choosing the official deadline and adhering to it, students could secure
their lottery ticket. Since early submissions did not give the students any grade advantage or
other reward, and all the essays would be graded after the official deadline, they had no reason
to self-impose an early deadline other than their desire to avoid procrastination.4
The survey also included questions about the Big-Five personality traits (the 10-item inven-
tory by Gosling et al., 2003), demographic characteristics (gender, age, parental education, and
nationality), risk attitudes (the 10-item risk aversion scale by Dohmen et al., 2011), impatience,
expected number of hours of work on the essay and expected own and average grade in the essay.
The ratio between the expected own grade and expected average grade is used as a measure
of relative confidence. At the end of the day on which the survey was run, the students were
sent an email to remind them about their chosen deadline, and encouraged to keep the email at
hand.5 No further reminders were sent, to avoid that reminders – rather than commitment –
may drive students’ submission behaviour.
The in-class study was run in the same course in two successive academic cohorts and the
data were pooled across the cohorts. After the course, we collected the grades both in the
current essay (grade 2) and in the course’s previous essay (grade 1), which was set earlier in the
term, had a very similar structure and counted 40% towards the final grade in the course. Due
to ethical guidelines, we were not able to have a control group not being offered the possibility
to self-impose early deadlines. However, we can compare the grade distribution and failure to
submit by the official deadline of our two treated cohorts with those of two untreated cohorts.
3The full survey can be found here. The consent form can be found here.
4The students knew that neither the seminar leader nor the course lecturer would be informed about their
self-chosen deadlines and other answers in the survey.
5The students wrote their ID number on the survey, and their email address is given by their ID number, so
their names and surnames were never known to the experimenters.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Age in years 261 19.33 2.66 Extraversion/Open 258 5.02 0.96
Gender (male) 262 0.48 0.50 Emot. Stable/Consc. 258 5.08 0.91
Parent with Degree 251 0.67 0.47 Agreeableness 259 4.38 0.91
British 254 0.27 0.45 Low Risk Taker 262 0.04 0.19
European/American 254 0.40 0.49 Medium Risk Taker 262 0.64 0.48
Asian/African 254 0.33 0.47 High Risk Taker 262 0.32 0.47
Second Academic Cohort 263 0.49 0.50 Impatience (dummy) 250 0.05 0.22
Expected Hours 251 25.71 22.99 Previous Grade 259 62.25 10.16
Relative Confidence 262 1.15 0.19 Current Grade 256 61.60 10.65
Commit 263 0.43 0.50 Early Deadline 109 1.90 1.65
3 Results
Summary statistics Table 1 presents the summary statistics. As the students filled in paper
questionnaires and could not be forced to answer all the questions, the number of observations
varies across questions.6 Little over half of the students are female and the average age is 19.
Most students have at least one parent with a degree. Nationalities are very diverse. The two
academic cohorts are of very similar size and are not significantly different in terms of observable
characteristics. The students expect to work on average 26 hours on the assignment and to do on
average 15% better than the average student. Due to significant positive correlations between
extraversion and openness, and emotional stability and conscientiousness, the Big Five were
condensed to three categories to avoid multicollinearity. The risk aversion scale was combined
into three bands – low (0-2), medium (3-6) and high (8-10). A small group of students indicate
high aversion to risk. A simple binary indicator for being impatient was constructed based on
whether the respondent would prefer to receive their prize immediately after the draw or rather
wait one further week and receive a 20% larger prize. Only a small group was identified as
impatient. Note that this simple indicator of impatience could reflect either high exponential
discounting or quasi-hyperbolic discounting; we are unable to discriminate between the two
sources of impatience in the current study. The average grade on the current assignment was
similar to the one completed earlier in the term.
More than 43% of the students committed to an early deadline. Conditional on committing,
the self-chosen early deadline was on average 1.90 days before the official one. Thus, commitment
demand is substantial as in AW, but the commitment chosen is less severe than in AW, namely
the chosen deadlines are less distant from the final possible deadline than in AW. Henceforth, we
will refer to students as “committed” if they chose a deadline strictly earlier than the official one,
and “non committed” otherwise. Over 73% of the students who committed to an early deadline
subsequently failed to adhere to it. The self-chosen early deadline was on average 2 days before
the official one among the students who failed to comply, and 1.63 before the official deadline
among the students who complied. The percentage of students who submitted the essay after
the official deadline was 15% among the committed and 9% among the non committed.
6The students who did not fully complete the survey are not statistically different from the remaining sample
in terms of relevant observable characteristics.
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Commitment demand Figure 1 shows the distribution of the self-chosen deadlines, where
each deadline is scored on the base of its distance from the official deadline (days in advance).
Over 57% of the students chose the official deadline (0 days in advance). Of those committing
to an early deadline, the majority chose one day before the official deadline.
Figure 1: Self-chosen deadlines
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Table 2 shows the correlates of the demand for commitment using a linear probability model
and a probit model.7 For either model, Specification (1) includes controls for gender, parental
degree, previous grade, expected effort in terms of hours of work and relative confidence, Spec-
ification (2) adds personality measures, and Specification (3) adds measures for willingness to
take risk and impatience. We find that students are more likely to demand soft commitment if
they expect the task to be more onerous, in terms of how many hours they expect to work on
the task and how they expect to perform relative to their peers. The linear probability model
shows that those who are less willing to take risks are less willing to commit, which is consis-
tent with the fact that committing imposes additional risk on the individual. While having a
positive coefficient, the effect of impatience is not statistically significant. The coefficients of
the demographic characteristics that were not significant in this or later stables are not shown.
Finally, different personality types do not exhibit different propensity to commit.
Commitment compliance In the full sample, over 37% of the students failed to comply with
their chosen deadline – whether an early deadline or the official one. Of those who committed to
an early deadline, over 73% subsequently broke it. Table 3 shows the correlates of the failure to
comply with the chosen deadline. Students who achieved a lower grade in the previous assign-
ment (and thus are less academically able) are more likely to fail to comply. This is intuitive.
Students with lower academic ability are more likely to be unable to finish the essay by an early
deadline, and thus to need to keep working on the essay past the soft, self-chosen deadline.
Extraverts/open students are more likely to fail to comply, while conscientious/emotionally sta-
ble students are more likely to comply. Finally, students with at least a parent with a degree
are more likely to fail to comply. The latter may be due to the fact that these students tend
7We also explored a tobit model, but there was not enough variation in the commitment demand.
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Table 2: Demand for soft commitment
Linear probability model Probit (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gender -0.022 -0.009 -0.011 -0.012 0.003 0.003
(0.065) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071) (0.074) (0.075)
Parents with Degree 0.019 0.003 -0.020 0.017 -0.001 -0.030
(0.069) (0.074) (0.076) (0.075) (0.080) (0.099)
Previous Grade -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Exp. hours 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010)
Confidence -0.495∗∗∗ -0.506∗∗∗ -0.477∗∗ -0.596∗∗∗ -0.615∗∗∗ -0.595
(0.180) (0.184) (0.187) (0.215) (0.222) (1.160)
Extraversion/Open 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.003
(0.036) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
Emot. Stable/Consc. 0.028 0.020 0.030 0.021
(0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.058)
Agreeableness 0.003 -0.000 0.005 -0.004
(0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.042)
Medium Risk Taker 0.390∗∗ 1.919
(0.174) (48.031)
High Risk Taker 0.398∗∗ 1.924
(0.181) (48.023)
Impatience (dummy) 0.214 0.241
(0.165) (0.493)
Other demographics and cohort Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 231 220 211 231 220 211
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
to be relatively more self-confident, and thus think that they will be capable to work well on
the essay at the last minute. Alternatively, it may be due to an income effect, as an expected
earning of £5 is truly negligible to students from high earning families. While, as mentioned,
the students were sent an email on the day of the survey reminding them of the deadline chosen
and encouraging them to keep this information at hand, we cannot exclude that some students
may have simply forgotten about the chosen commitment.
Table 4 shows the correlates of the failure to comply with the early, soft deadline. Thus,
it repeats the regressions in Table 3 in the subsample of students who committed to a strictly
early deadline. While the much smaller sample size leads to lower statistical power, the results
in Table 3 are confirmed.
Grades As mentioned, due to ethical guidelines, it was not possible to have a control group
that was not offered the possibility to choose an early deadline. Hence, we cannot estimate the
causal impact of soft commitment demand on grades. However, we can compare our sample’s
grades and compliance with the official deadline, with those of two untreated cohorts following
our study.8 This is illustrated by Figure 2. The first distribution (from the left) illustrates
the grades of the students who were offered the opportunity to choose an early deadline – the
“treated cohorts on the treated assignment”. The second distribution illustrates the grades in the
earlier essay for the same set of students – the “treated cohorts on the untreated assignment”.
The final two distributions illustrate the grades of the subsequent untreated cohorts in the
8Since the course was run for the first time when we ran our study, it is not possible to use earlier cohorts.
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Table 3: Failure to comply with the chosen deadline
Linear probability model Probit (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gender 0.060 0.064 0.089∗ 0.059 0.061 0.079
(0.049) (0.050) (0.053) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Parentswith Degree 0.119∗∗ 0.102∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.098∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.051) (0.054) (0.057) (0.050) (0.052) (0.054)
Previous Grade -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Exp. hours 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Confidence 0.054 0.112 0.087 0.110 0.146 0.127
(0.137) (0.136) (0.141) (0.132) (0.127) (0.134)
Extraversion/Open 0.064∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026)
Emot. Stable/Consc. -0.059∗∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.068∗∗ -0.069∗∗
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029)
Agreeableness 0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.011
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027)
Medium Risk Taker -0.070 -0.058
(0.131) (0.132)
High Risk Taker -0.126 -0.102
(0.136) (0.133)
Impatience (dummy) 0.044 0.036
(0.123) (0.109)
Other demographics and cohort Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 231 220 211 231 220 211
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Failure to comply with the early, soft deadline
Linear probability model Probit (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gender 0.168∗ 0.162∗ 0.192∗ 0.156∗ 0.160∗ 0.196∗∗
(0.093) (0.097) (0.101) (0.085) (0.084) (0.086)
Parent with Degree 0.203∗∗ 0.146 0.183 0.175∗∗ 0.122 0.159∗
(0.093) (0.106) (0.110) (0.077) (0.089) (0.091)
Previous Grade -0.008∗ -0.007 -0.007 -0.017∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Exp. hours 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Confidence -0.049 -0.025 -0.049 0.043 -0.039 -0.039
(0.261) (0.270) (0.280) (0.290) (0.293) (0.318)
Extraversion/Open 0.088 0.093∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.100∗∗
(0.053) (0.055) (0.044) (0.046)
Emot. Stable/Consc. -0.080 -0.059 -0.102∗∗ -0.088
(0.057) (0.061) (0.050) (0.053)
Agreeableness -0.010 -0.020 -0.030 -0.041
(0.055) (0.057) (0.050) (0.051)
Medium Will. to Take Risk 0.053 0.074
(0.106) (0.097)
Impatience (dummy) 0.118 0.092
(0.205) (0.179)
Other demographics and cohort Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 96 92 89 96 92 89
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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two assignments. We find not evidence that soft commitment affects student grades. This
is consistent with recent evidence by Himmler et al. (2017), who find a positive effect of soft
commitment on the number of exams taken and passed, but no effect on the grades.
Figure 2: Grade distribution for treated and untreated cohorts
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Comparing the second and fourth distribution in Figure 3, it can be noted that there was no
selection into committing to an early deadline by the students’ grade on their earlier assignment.
Moreover, Figure 3 shows that neither the committed nor the non committed exhibited any
significant change in average grade between the earlier and the current assignment, even though
those who committed appear to have increased the spread in their grades.
Figure 3: Grade distribution by commitment status
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Compliance with the official deadline The fraction of students breaking the official dead-
line is slightly lower in the untreated cohorts than in the treated ones, but the difference is not
significant. Similarly, the fraction of committed students breaking the official deadline is bigger
than the corresponding fraction of uncommitted students, but the difference is not significant.
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4 Conclusion
This paper has presented a study aimed at exploring the demand for soft, self-imposed,
deadline-based commitment, and subsequent compliance behaviour. We find a substantial de-
mand for soft commitment, but the commitment chosen is weak, and the failure to comply with
the chosen commitment is remarkably high. Students are more likely to demand soft commit-
ment if they expect to work on the task more hours and to perform worse than their peers.
They are more likely to break the chosen commitment if they got a lower grade in the previous
assignment, are more open/extraver and less emotionally stable/conscientious.
Our findings raise two important, yet unanswered, questions that future research may ad-
dress. First, in order to design more effective commitment devices, it is necessary to understand
why people do not comply with soft commitment. In particular, is the failure to comply mainly
driven by unexpected events or by a deviation from full sophistication? Second, it is crucial to
understand whether soft commitment is beneficial even when broken. In the context of deadline-
based commitment, can self-imposing an early deadline induce a more efficient effort allocation,
and thus a better performance, even when people fail to comply with the self-chosen deadline?
Understanding the latter would help to evaluate the welfare effects of soft commitment, and
compare them with the welfare effects of hard commitment. We hope that future research will
build on our study’s findings and investigate these policy relevant, open questions.
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